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Abstract 
Debates surrounding working longer focus mainly on increasing legal and eff ective retirement ages, leaving 
the preferred retirement age largely overlooked. There is a large East-West divide in Europe regarding the 
latter, with individuals in Eastern Europe wanting to retire earlier. We aim to explain this gap in terms of 
diff erences in working conditions and state-level legal conditions. Using the 2010 European Social Survey 
data on employed individuals aged 50-70 in 24 countries enriched with country-level information, we fi nd 
that part of the explanation is found in the lower levels of job control found in Eastern Europe. Moreover, 
the results suggest that Karasek’s job demand/control model fi ts better in Western than Eastern European 
countries. Another explanation is found at the country level, where the legal retirement age accounts for 
a major part of the gap in preferred retirement ages between East and West.
Keywords: Preferred retirement age, job demand, job control, legal retirement age, Europe.
Introduction
With the Europe 2020 strategy, the European Union set fi ve ambitious targets for socio-economic 
development. One of them is the goal to have an employment rate of 75 per cent among the 
population of active age. In order to reach such a goal, eff orts are usually oriented towards keeping 
older individuals in paid employment longer. Countries mainly try to attain the latter by restricting 
policies allowing for early exit or by simply raising the legal retirement age. Less attention is paid 
to accompanying measures regarding the organisation of work that would physically and mentally 
allow individuals to work longer. Moreover, decisions regarding the extension of working life are 
usually backed with arguments of fi nancial sustainability rather than social support, and they often 
do cause social unrest. As many Eastern European countries have been in the process of raising the 
offi  cial retirement age since the collapse of the Soviet Union — or will have to do so in the near future 
in order to reach the European employment targets —, it is a relevant question to ask ourselves: at 
what age would individuals in Eastern and Western Europe like to retire, and which characteristics of 
individuals, countries or societies infl uence this preferred retirement age.
Karasek’s demand/control model (Karasek & Theorell, 1990) has been used several times in the early 
retirement context. The model was originally developed to explain phenomena such as occupational 
health and stress, and if job demand and control indeed do aff ect mental and physical wellbeing, it is 
not a far-fetched idea to assume it will also shape individuals’ retirement preferences. According to 
the model, high job demands have detrimental consequences for the body and the mind, unless they 
coincide with high job control: the ability to regulate one’s own labour allows individuals to cope 
with these demands. Hence, not only are job demands and job control important determinants, so 
is their interaction. Unfortunately, many studies extending Karasek’s model to the early retirement 
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literature have overlooked this interaction (Schreurs, De Cuyper, Van Ammerik, Hoteliers & De Witte, 
2011; Siegrist & Wahrendorf, 2010; Wahrendorf, Dragano & Siegrist, 2013) or did not include job control 
altogether (Volkoff , Buisset & Mardon, 2010; Esser, 2005a), even though it is at the core of the model.
Not only do individual traits such as job characteristics shape retirement preferences, societal and 
state features do so as well. Out of the many institutions possibly infl uencing individuals’ retirement 
decisions, we are mainly interested in how the legal retirement age infl uences when individuals want 
to retire. To that end, we apply two institutionalist approaches: Hodgson (2012) and Archer (2004) both 
argue that institutionalist theories should explain how exactly institutions causally aff ect behaviours, 
but they do so in diff erent ways. In Hodgson’s theory, institutions are internalised in such a way that 
individuals start acting in accordance with them out of habit. Archer, on the contrary, has a more 
rationalist approach in which individuals decide upon a course of action after ‘internal conversation’, 
while institutions merely restrict or enable certain possible options. Both approaches are compatible 
and can be applied to the role of the legal retirement age in the formation of retirement preferences. 
Initially, the legal retirement age can be an institution that limits the possible retirement options to 
choose from, in line with Archer’s view on institutionalism, a preference that can then be internalised 
in a way similar to Hodgson’s habit.
We conduct this research against a background of East-West diff erences in Europe. The mark that 
Soviet rule left on individuals’ lives is still apparent today, not least in terms of lower life expectancies 
(de Beer, 2006). The Soviet Union also still lingers in many policies of Eastern European countries, 
among others in retirement policies. The principle that women should retire earlier than men, for 
instance, has been abandoned in most Western European countries but is still present in most post-
Soviet states. One could argue that there is more uniformity in legal retirement ages in Western Europe 
in general, as can be seen in Figure 1: while the retirement age in the majority of Western European 
countries is 65, for both men and women, in Eastern Europe retirement ages fl uctuate between 60 and 
62 for women and 62 to 65 for men. When looking at the eff ective retirement age, more variation is 
found in both East and West. Men and women in Estonia and Bulgaria on average even work beyond 
their respective legal retirement ages, likely the consequence of low pension benefi ts (Romans, 2007). 
Finally, the preferred retirement age of the population aged 50 to 64 is also included in Figure 1. It 
reveals a substantive East-West divide: in most Western European countries, individuals on average 
would like to work well beyond the age of 60 – except in France, Greece and, to a certain extent, 
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Figure 1: Overview of legal, eff ective and preferred retirement ages of individuals aged 50-64, by 
country in 2010
Source: own calculations based on European Social Survey (2014a), Eurostat (2013) and MISSOC (2010)
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Portugal and Belgium. In all of the Eastern European countries, on the other hand, the preferred 
retirement age is below 60. As a result, the discrepancy between eff ective and preferred retirement 
age is larger in former socialist countries than it is in the rest of Europe.
This observed diff erence in preferred retirement age between East and West is the starting point 
for this article. After elaborating on the theoretical framework and discussing data and methods used, 
we try to explain this diff erence in the results section. Finally, we feed our fi ndings back to the theory 
in the conclusion, ending with some suggestions for policy-making and directions for future research.
Theoretical framework
Job demand and job control
In organisation studies, it is often stressed that if we want people to work longer, we should change 
jobs so that they allow people to work longer. Usually, Karasek’s psychological demand/decision 
latitude model (Karasek & Theorell, 1990) is referred to in this regard. According to that model, two 
specifi c aspects of a job are key to explaining stress and bad physical and mental health: job demand 
and job control. Job demand refers to the workload of a job. For certain jobs, such as watchmen and 
janitors, the workload is rather limited, while for instance waiters are found at the higher end of the 
spectrum. The other dimension, job control, refers to the level of decision latitude in a job, which is 
linked to educational level and training. This freedom to make decisions can refer to job content as 
well as to aspects such as the timing or division of labour. In line with tailorism, assembly line work is 
highly repetitive, with superiors deciding what the assembler has to do, when he has to do it, and how 
fast it should happen. Scientists, on the contrary, have a high freedom to decide what to investigate, 
and when they want to work.
According to Karasek’s model, job demand and job control interact in their infl uence on stress, 
mental and physical health. Low-strain jobs are characterised by low levels of job demand and high 
levels of job control, typically leading to low stress levels and high job satisfaction. The European 
Working Conditions survey shows that jobs in education, public administration and skilled agricultural 
work fall in this category (Eurofound, 2012, p. 125). Active jobs also have high levels of job control, but 
combine these with high job demands. These jobs are highly challenging and stimulating, and hence 
coincide with high job satisfaction. Stress caused by high job demand is limited by the freedom to 
organise one’s own work. The main risk in these jobs, according to Karasek and Theorell (1990, p. 35), 
is not stress but fatigue. Typical cases are managers, professionals and technicians, but also jobs in 
fi nancial services and construction are more likely to be active ones (Eurofound, 2012, p. 125). High 
strain jobs combine high job demand and low job control. People in these jobs are confronted with the 
highest stress levels and the mental and physical health problems they cause, making these jobs very 
unsustainable. Blue-collar workers are likely to be in this category, as are people working in industry 
and transportation (Eurofound, 2012, p. 125). Finally, passive jobs have both low levels of job demands 
and job control. Though stress is limited in these jobs, they lead to demotivation and ultimately de-
skilling. Service and sales workers are typically found in passive jobs (Eurofound, 2012, p. 125).
Many studies have related Karasek’s framework to retirement, and among those studies including 
job control, there is a consensus that low job control triggers early retirement or the wish thereof. 
In diff erent populations, job control has been linked to a decrease in early retirement intentions 
(Schreurs et al., 2011), higher odds of being in employment at age 60 (Siegrist & Wahrendorf, 2010) 
and fewer early retirement thoughts (Elovainio, Forma, Kivimäki, Sinervo, Sutinen & Laine, 2005). In 
Wahrendorf, Dragano and Siegrist’s (2013) study, those with low job control indicated more often that 
they want to retire as early as possible, and Heponiemi, Kouvonen, Vänskä, Halila, Sinervo, Kivimäki 
and Elovainio (2008) also stipulate the importance of job control.
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There is less agreement on whether job demand infl uences (the wish for) early retirement in the 
literature. Schreurs et al. (2011) and Elovainio et al. (2005) confi rm such an eff ect, and also Volkoff , 
Buisset and Mardon (2010) and Esser (2005a) link job demand to early retirement wishes. Siegrist and 
Wahrendorf (2010), on the contrary, found no relation between job demands and being in employment 
at age 60. This disagreement might be the consequence of some of these studies not taking job 
control into account (Volkoff , Buisset, & Mardon, 2010; Esser, 2005a), while others do not include the 
interaction between job demand and job control (Schreurs et al., 2011; Siegrist & Wahrendorf, 2010; 
Wahrendorf, Dragano, & Siegrist, 2013), which is key to Karasek’s model, as job control can ‘buff er’ the 
impact of job demands (Demerouti & Bakker, 2011).
Elovainio et al. (2005) did include the interaction and found it was very important in explaining 
early retirement thoughts: retirement thoughts occurred least among individuals in low-strain jobs 
and only slightly more among those in passive jobs, while the gap between workers in active and high-
strain jobs, both found to consider early retirement considerably more, was much more substantial. 
However, the little diff erence found between individuals in low-strain and passive jobs might be 
the consequence of the indicators used to measure early retirement thoughts: being able to cope 
with one’s work until the offi  cial retirement age and having considered seeking disability or early 
retirement pension. The fi rst item may capture mental and physical strain rather than demotivation, 
and though the second item does encompass it, it might be very dependent on age: one would assume 
that a 20-year-old in a demotivating job has considered applying for some kind of pension much 
less than a 50-year-old in the same situation. Hence, the indicators Elovainio et al. (2005) used in 
combination with the sample stretching from age 20 to 65 may have failed to suffi  ciently account for 
the demotivating character of passive jobs.
If we link Karasek’s model with preferred retirement age via mental and physical well-being, we 
can make a set of expectations about how job demand and job control would aff ect when individuals 
would want to retire. As low-strain jobs (low demands, high control) are most enjoyable and least 
harmful, we could expect individuals in such jobs to want to work the longest. Active jobs (high 
demands, high control) are challenging though they cause some stress and fatigue, so individuals in 
those jobs will want to work long as well, though less long than those in low-strain jobs. People in 
passive and high-strain jobs would want to retire earlier, though they have diff erent reasons to want 
to do so. While those in high-strain jobs may want to retire early due to high stress levels and resulting 
mental and physical health problems, demotivation is a sizable trigger for individuals in passive 
jobs to want to leave the labour market. Therefore, we will hypothesise that people in passive and 
high-strain jobs will want to retire at the same time. Hence, we hypothesise fi rst that the preferred 
retirement age increases with increasing job control (1a); second, that the preferred retirement age is 
not infl uenced by the level of job demand (1b); and third, that the interaction of job demand and job 
control will have a negative eff ect on the preferred retirement age (1c). 
All the reviewed literature has studied the infl uence of working conditions on retirement age in 
Western countries. However, there are signifi cant diff erences in working conditions between East 
and West in Europe: jobs tend to be less secure in Eastern Europe, pay by eff ort is more common 
and compensation for overtime and weekend work are rarer than in Western Europe. Moreover, 
Eastern and Southern Europeans are at a greater mental health risk at work (Eurofound, 2013). These 
diff erences in the working conditions are partly caused by the diff erent labour market structures: 
compared to the West, unskilled workers are overrepresented and skilled workers underrepresented 
in Eastern European labour markets (Cörvers & Meriküll, 2007). Despite these diff erences, we have 
no theoretical reasons to believe working conditions aff ect preferred retirement age diff erently in 
Western and Eastern European countries and hence assume in our hypotheses that this impact is 
in accordance with the Karasek model in both parts of Europe. Besides working conditions, there 
are also diff erences in terms of work ethic. Previous research has shown that individuals in more 
prosperous countries, and especially in countries with higher social benefi ts, have a more traditional 
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work ethic: they are more convinced that working is a duty to society (Esser, 2005b). In Western 
Europe people agree more that work off ers self-fulfi lment and is a social obligation (Giorgi & Marsh, 
1990). Of all Western Europe, work commitment is highest in Scandinavia and the lowest in liberal 
market economies (Hult & Svallfors, 2002). The study does not contain Eastern European countries, 
but as many are liberal market economies, we can assume that the work commitment will be rather 
low in a European perspective.
State level institutions
The individual is not totally free in making the decision to retire. Such decisions are shaped by their 
historical context and the formal and informal institutions they entail: not only the legal framework, 
but also norms constrain individuals’ retirement decisions. While the causal mechanisms discussed 
above are situated at the micro-level, in this section we go into how countries and societies (macro) 
matter for individuals’ retirement behaviour and preferences. In this study, we mainly focus on 
retirement policies.
Hodgson (2012, p. 301) acknowledges that “institutions have the power to mould the dispositions 
and behaviours of agents in fundamental ways; they have a capacity to change aspirations, instead of 
merely enabling or constraining them”, and describes a process through which institutions change 
these behaviours and dispositions as “reconstitutive downward causation”. Habit is key to this 
process: while initially individuals may deliberately act in accordance with a certain institution such 
as a policy, this behaviour can be internalised via the creation of habits, even to such an extent that 
it can change individuals’ perceptions of what is appropriate and what is not (Hodgson, 2004; 2012; 
Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004). These preferences then form the background according to which an 
individual decides to behave in a certain way. Indeed, normative compliance of the individual is at the 
core of institutionalist theory (Peters, 2005, pp. 39-40).
Archer (2004) off ers an alternative though complementary explanation, linking institutions to 
individual behaviour in a more refl exive way. When having to decide on a course of action, Archer 
says, individuals have an ‘internal conversation’ in which they try to fi nd a compromise between their 
needs and concerns, and the restrictions and enablements posed by institutions (Fleetwood, 2008). 
Hence, individuals deliberately and refl exively choose to act or behave in a certain way, though not 
necessarily rationally in the economic, maximising sense (Fleetwood, 2008). Sztompka (1991) develops 
a similar argument where structures such as institutions constrain the situation of the individual, 
creating a certain frame within which individuals make decisions according to their needs and desires.
It seems plausible that the preferred retirement age is the result of an internal conversation in 
which the individual considers factors such as legal retirement age, (perceived) eff ective retirement 
age and a series of personal elements such as family, well-being and job appreciation. In this logic, 
the legal retirement age would essentially be used as a reference point, from which the individual 
would deduct a certain amount of years depending on how he or she assesses his or her personal 
situation. As pointed out above, however, Hodgson’s and Archer’s arguments are compatible: it takes 
some time for a habit to develop, and in the context of retirement preferences a habit is likely to 
emerge based on an earlier internal conversation. This may become apparent in situations where 
the legal retirement age recently changed, where individuals who are closer to retirement and hence 
may have thought about retirement before, might use the previous retirement age rather than the 
current one as their reference point. In conclusion, we hypothesise fi rst that legal retirement age 
infl uences individuals’ preferred retirement age (2a); and second, that preferred retirement age of 
older individuals in countries that have changed their retirement age recently would be infl uenced by 
the previous rather than the current retirement age (2b).
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Data and methods
We use the 2010 European Social Survey (European Social Survey, 2014a) data, as this wave contains a 
special module on family, work and well-being. From 27 countries available in the dataset, we exclude 
three countries that are not members of the European Union or the European Free Trade Association 
due to availability of country-level information.1 As certain questions related to Karasek’s model are 
only asked from employees, we limit our sample to employees aged 50 to 69. Individuals younger 
than 50 are further away from retirement and thus may have given retirement less thought. Jensen, 
Andersen and Breidahl (2006, p. 73), for instance, fi nd that people in their forties have the least realistic 
retirement expectations. Regarding the country-level, legal data are drawn from MISSOC (2010), socio-
economic data from Eurostat (2015) and attitudes towards elders from the ageism module of the 2008 
European Social Survey (2014b).
Preferred retirement age, our dependent variable, is operationalized using the question “At what 
age would you like to retire?” Our key independent variables at the individual level, job demands and 
job control, are composed variables with an eleven-point scale (0-10). Job control consists of whether 
the management allows you to “decide how your own daily work is organised”, “infl uence policy 
decisions about the activities of the organisation” and “choose or change your pace of work”, and 
whether one agrees with the statements “there is a lot of variety in my work” and “my job requires that 
I keep learning new things”. Factor analysis renders ambiguous results: using the eigenvalue greater 
than one criterion only one factor should be maintained, while the eigenvalue scatterplot renders a 
two-factor solution, grouping the fi rst three and last two items. Based on theoretical grounds – for 
Karasek, they are two sides of the same coin –, the strong correlation of both factors in the two-
factor solution and the good Cronbach’s Alpha when combined (0.78), we decide to turn them into 
one variable ‘job control’. Creating the job demands construct with the items available in the dataset 
is less straightforward, and after factor and reliability analysis only two items could be maintained: 
the agreement with the statements ‘my job requires that I work very hard’ and ‘I never seem to have 
enough time to get everything done in my job’.
A general measure for ‘feeling good’ is created, including items referring to satisfaction with life, 
happiness, cheerfulness, being relaxed and being active. Factor analysis yields ambiguous results very 
similar to those for job control, with one or two highly correlated factors. This might be the result of 
the fact that the fi rst two questions are asked in general terms, while the latter three specifi cally refer 
to one’s mood during the last two weeks. Based on the above and the good Cronbach’s Alpha (0.80), 
we decide to make one construct ‘feeling good’. All constructs made are also tested using separate 
factor and reliability analyses for Western and Eastern Europe. Even though most of these concepts 
were originally developed for use in a Western context, the performance measures in the East are very 
similar to those in the West, and some are even slightly better.
We employ multilevel linear regression (SAS proc mixed). First, we run random intercept multilevel 
models containing only individual-level variables, where we test our hypotheses related to Karasek’s 
model. We run separate models for Eastern and Western European countries, to assess to what extent 
the eff ects of working conditions on preferred retirement age are diff erent across both parts of Europe. 
Then we put all countries together and add a dummy variable distinguishing post-socialist countries 
from the rest of Europe. We try to account for this East-West diff erence by inserting other country-level 
variables such as the legal retirement age in subsequent models. We also made structural equation 
models (SEM) using the R package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) to investigate some indirect individual-level 
eff ects. These models are not presented due to the limitations on article length, but can be requested 
from the authors.
1 The countries in our analysis are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
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Results
Post-Soviet countries diverge from the rest of Europe in terms of job control, job demand and well-
being. In Table 1, their mean scores are presented and signifi cant diff erences between East and West 
indicated. The regions diff er substantially on job control: On an 11-point scale, job control is 1.3 points 
lower in the East than in the West. Western Europe scores higher on all job control items, especially on 
having control over the organisation of daily work (2.0) and being able to infl uence work policy (1.6). 
The diff erence in job demand is smaller (0.5): respondents in the East of Europe on average declare to 
work slightly harder, those in the West more often say they lack time to get their work done. Regarding 
mental and physical well-being, the West consistently scores better than the East. Individuals in the 
West feel better (0.6), mainly due to higher life satisfaction and happiness levels. They have somewhat 
higher job satisfaction levels (0.3) and experience a little less work-family spillover (–0.2) than those 
living in the East. Finally, respondents living in post-socialist countries reported somewhat worse 
health.
In Table 2, three random intercept models explaining preferred retirement age are presented: one 
with control variables, a second where job demand, job control and their interaction enter the model, 
and a third where well-being variables are included. Every model is run twice: once for post-socialist 
countries (‘East’) and once for the rest of Europe (‘West’). With an average R2 of 0.45, the full model 
(Model 3) has good explanatory power when run for all countries separately (lowest in Germany, 0.18; 
highest in Greece and Croatia, 0.78). In Model 1, we see that the eff ect of sex diff ers strongly between 
Table 1: Mean scores of job characteristics and well-being variables in two models, by region in Europe
Karasek model Scale East West p
Job control 0-10 4.85 6.04 ***
Organise daily work 0-10 5.09 7.04 ***
Infl uence policy decisions 0-10 2.35 3.97 ***
Choose pace of work 0-10 4.97 6.17 ***
Variety in job 0-3 1.73 2.07 ***
Learning in job 0-3 1.63 1.73 **
Job demand 0-10 5.71 6.23 ***
Hard work 0-4 2.89 2.71 ***
Lack time 0-4 1.68 2.27 ***
Mental and physical well-being
Feeling good 0-10 6.34 6.93 ***
Satisfi ed with life 0-10 6.26 7.10 ***
Happy 0-10 6.73 7.47 ***
Cheerful and in good spirits 0-5 3.10 3.46 ***
Calm and relaxed 0-5 3.02 3.18 ***
Active and vigorous 0-5 3.18 3.24 †
Job satisfaction 0-10 6.73 7.05 ***
Satisfi ed with job 0-10 7.21 7.56 ***
Satisfi ed with time balance 0-10 6.16 6.48 ***
Work-family spillover 0-10 4.61 4.43 **
Tired after work 0-4 2.02 1.94 **
Lack family time 0-4 1.64 1.58 †
Subjective health: in bad health 0-4 1.41 1.22 ***
†p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Source: autors’ compilation based on ESS data
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both parts of Europe: in Eastern Europe, women want to retire on average more than two years 
earlier than men, in the West only half a year. This could be the consequence of gender diff erences in 
legal retirement ages being more common in Eastern European countries. Further, older people want 
to retire later: per one year increase in age, the preferred retirement age increases by about three 
months.
Education does not aff ect preferred retirement age. The absence of an eff ect of higher education 
is especially striking as individuals with a higher education degree would typically enter the labour 
force at a later age, but apparently they are not willing to work until a later age. The SEM models do 
attribute some strong indirect eff ects to education, linking it to suffi  ciency of household income and 
job characteristics. They indicate educational inequalities in terms of job demand and especially job 
control, most notably in Eastern Europe. Strikingly, Western European respondents living together 
with individuals older than 75 on average want to work a year and a half longer than those who do 
not — an eff ect not found in post-socialist countries. Possibly, live-in elders are in need of some kind of 
care or help, in which case out-of-house work can mean a time-out from caring. Regarding migration, 
we fi nd that fi rst generation migrants — again, only in the West — on average want to work almost 
Table 2: Random intercept models explaining preferred retirement age in Eastern and Western Europe, 
individual-level eff ects (in months)
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3
West East West East West East
 B p B P  B p B p  B p B p
Control variables
Female –5.7 ** –25.9 *** -3.9 * –28.0 *** –3.7 † –28.4 ***
Age 3.3 *** 2.7 *** 3.6 *** 2.8 *** 3.5 *** 3.0 ***
Education
< higher secondary (R.C.)
Higher secondary –0.1 2.3 –1.1 1.5 0.0 2.9
Tertiary 1.3 6.9 1.2 5.3 3.0 7.9 †
Lives with child(ren) (< 18) 0.2 –3.9 0.7 –2.4 0.7 –2.2
Lives with elder(s) (>75) 18.6 *** 5.3 17.2 *** 6.5 18.6 *** 7.2 †
Migrant: 1st generation 9.6 ** 1.8 10.3 *** 1.6 8.8 ** 0.5
Migrant: 2nd generation –2.3 –1.3 –1.7 –5.2 –1.0 –7.2
Household income insuffi  cient –1.7 –4.3 ** –0.6 –3.5 * 2.5 † –1.1
Karasek model
Job control 5.0 *** 2.8 * 4.1 *** 3.0 *
Job demand 0.5 1.5 0.8 2.7 *
Job control * job demand –0.3 † –0.4 † –0.3 † –0.5 *
Mental and physical well-being
Feeling good 2.2 *** –1.3 *
Job satisfaction 2.7 *** 2.8 ***
Work-family spillover 0.7 † –0.7
Bad health           –4.2 *** –8.3 ***
N 3,075  1,563   2,976  1,497   2,973  1,483  
†p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Note: The control variables in the models are education, presence of children and elders in the household, 
migration background, suffi  ciency of household income, job contol, job demand, the interaction of control and 
demand, well-being, job-satisfaction, work-family spillover and subjective health. Inclusion of the country-level 
variables does not aff  ect any of the individual-level eff  ects, apart from the eff  ects of female and age (presented 
here) and work-family spillover becoming insignifi cant
Source: autors’ compilation based on ESS data
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ten months longer than natives. Second generation migrants have the same retirement preferences 
as the latter, though the SEM models show an indirect eff ect through feeling good in the whole of 
Europe. Finally, Eastern Europeans with insuffi  cient household income (a four-point scale) want to 
work up to one year less — likely a spurious eff ect as it disappears after inclusion of job characteristics 
and well-being variables.
The variables connected to Karasek’s theory are introduced in Model 2. The results confi rm our 
hypotheses: job control has a positive eff ect on preferred retirement age (1a), job demand does not 
aff ect the dependent variable (1b) and their interaction has a negative eff ect — though only at α = 0.1 
(1c). There are, however, some diff erences between post-socialist and other European countries in 
terms of eff ect sizes, most notably that job control has twice the impact on preferred retirement age 
in the West compared to the East. Individuals in low-strain jobs (job control = 8; job demand = 3) want 
to work more than 20 months longer than those in passive jobs (job control = 3; job demand = 3) 
in the West, compared to eight months in the East. Those in high strain jobs (job control = 3; job 
demand = 8) do not diff er from individuals in passive jobs in their retirement preference, both in the 
East and West. Finally, and most surprisingly, while Western individuals in active jobs (job control = 8; 
job demand = 8) want to retire one year later than those in passive jobs, there is no diff erence in the 
East. Hence, our predictions based on Karasek’s model seem to work better in Western than in Eastern 
Europe. This becomes all the more clear when adding variables concerning well-being (Model 3). In 
Western Europe, they indeed work as intermediary variables to a certain extent, explaining about 20 
per cent of the eff ects of job control and the interaction term. Among Eastern European countries, 
on the contrary, they act as suppressors for job demand: after controlling, the eff ect of job demand 
almost doubles and becomes signifi cant (α = 0.05). This suggests that the variables on mental and 
physical well-being are mainly related to job control in Western Europe, and job demand in the East. 
Finally, health impacts retirement preferences in Eastern Europe twice as strongly as in the West, 
though this could be the consequence of health having a stronger indirect eff ect via feeling good in 
Western Europe according to the SEM models.
The fi nding that Karasek’s model works better in Western than in Eastern Europe might be related 
to diff erences regarding job satisfaction. According to Fargher, Kesting, Lange and Pacheco (2008), 
job satisfaction is strongly related to the broader social and cultural context in the West, while it is 
mainly related to income and how important one considers work in the East. If merely having a job 
matters, and if possible a well-paying one, this could explain why job demand and job control have 
similar eff ects on preferred retirement age in Eastern Europe, when controlled for the detrimental 
consequences of high job demand on well-being. Our fi nding that people feeling good want to work 
longer in the West and less long in the East indeed shows that this explanation is a plausible one. 
However, this does not explain why Eastern Europeans in active jobs on average do not want to work 
longer than those in passive jobs.
To what extent is the diff erence in preferred retirement age between Eastern and Western Europe 
the consequence of diff erences in policies, and more specifi cally legal retirement age? Some 16 
per cent of the variation between individuals can be the result of diff erences between countries. 
We take the third model of Table 2 for all individuals together and add a dummy variable ‘East’ 
distinguishing Eastern from Western European countries. The resulting model (Table 3, Model 1) shows 
a 27-month diff erence in preferred retirement age between Eastern and Western European countries. 
Subsequently, we add the legal retirement age for men and women (for methodological reasons, 
the latter is constructed as the diff erence between male and female retirement ages multiplied by 
the variable ‘female’), explaining about 45 per cent of the diff erence between Eastern and Western 
European countries. This halves the eff ect of sex, indeed suggesting that a large part of the gender 
eff ect is the consequence of many countries, especially in the East, having diff erent legal retirement 
ages for men and women. In countries with equal retirement ages for men and women, the preferred 
retirement age for women is on average about four months less than that of men. In countries with 
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a lower retirement age for women, women want to retire on average another three months earlier 
per year of diff erence between the male and female retirement ages. The legal retirement age for 
men has a stronger impact on individuals’ retirement preferences: a raise of one year coincides with 
a fi ve-month increase in the preferred retirement age. However, the coeffi  cient being less than one 
means that the gap between people’s preferences and the offi  cial situation is bigger in countries with 
a higher legal retirement age.
In order to test whether the eff ect of legal retirement age is not a spurious one, we run a series 
of models including male and female legal retirement ages and one, exceptionally two other control 
variables at the country level (not presented here). Sixteen such control variables are tested: six socio-
economic variables (eff ective retirement age, life expectancy at age 65, at risk of poverty and social 
exclusion rate among people aged 65+, empirical pension replacement rate, median income in PPS 
and life-long learning), six variables connected to ageism (age at which people are considered old, 
importance of being unprejudiced against other age groups, importance of being seen as unprejudiced 
against other age groups, and whether individuals aged 50 to 70 feel they are being prejudiced, 
not respected and treated badly because of age) and four variables regarding policies allowing for 
the advancement or postponement of retirement (early retirement age, fi nancial penalty for early 
retirement, bonus for postponing retirement, combinability of pension and employment income). 
Only three of these variables aff ect the dependent variable signifi cantly (α = 0.1) when included in a 
model with the legal retirement age variables: eff ective retirement age, median income in PPS and 
lifelong learning. None of these variables cause a reduction in eff ect size or signifi cance of the male 
and female retirement ages, thereby confi rming Hypothesis 2a.
The eff ective retirement age does not contribute to a reduction of the diff erence between East and 
West and the eff ect of lifelong learning disappears when controlled for median income. Therefore, they 
are not included in Table 3. Model 3 shows that the diff erence between Eastern and Western European 
countries can be completely explained with three variables: the male and female legal retirement 
ages and median income — the latter likely being an indicator of the socio-economic development of 
a society as a whole.
Table 3: Random intercept models explaining preferred retirement age, country-level eff ects (in months)
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4
 B p  B p  B p  B p
Control variables
Female –7.9 *** –4.3 * –4.4 * –4.1 *
Age 3.4 *** 3.4 *** 3.4 *** 3.4 ***
Country level
East –26.9 *** –14.6 ** –2.7
Legal retirement age (LRA) men 5.4 *** 5.1 *** 7.3 ***
(LRA men - LRA women) * female –3.0 *** –2.8 *** –3.0 ***
LRA 2010 - LRA 2004 (men) –0.1
(LRA 2010 - LRA 2004) * age 0.3
Median income (PPS, in thousands) 1.3 *
N (individual) 4,456   4,456   4,456   4,146  
N (country) 24   24   24   22  
†p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Note: The following control variables are included in the models but not shown here: being married or in a 
partnership, household size, working for a public organisation, company size, sector (19 categories, based on 
NACE) and occupation (9 categories, based on ISCO-88)
Source: autors’ compilation based on ESS data
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Finally, we do not fi nd support for Hypothesis 2b in Model 4. In this model, we add the diff erence 
in legal retirement ages for men2 between 2010 and 2004, as well as the interaction of this variable 
with age. However, with only three countries having changed the retirement age in this period, it 
should not be surprising that no eff ect is found.
When performing simple Ordinary Least Squares regression of countries, the dependent variable 
being the male and female country averages of the preferred retirement age, we can analyse the 
residuals of the countries (i.e. the diff erence between the countries’ real values on the dependent 
variable and the values predicted based on the independent variables). For this test, we use the 
country-level variables presented in Table 3. We will only discuss the ‘outliers’, that is, the countries 
with residuals more than one standard deviation from the predicted value; none are two standard 
deviations away. Denmark and the UK have a real value higher than the predicted value for both men 
and women, just like women in Lithuania and men in Ireland. The availability of partial retirement 
schemes could off er an explanation for Denmark, allowing for a phasing out of the labour market 
via part-time employment (The Social Protection Committee, 2007). The position of Ireland and the 
UK could be the consequence of the absence of early retirement schemes (The Social Protection 
Committee, 2008); and the high poverty rate among Lithuanians above age 65 might explain why 
Lithuanian women are less eager to retire than could be expected. At the lower end we fi nd Belgium 
and Greece for both sexes, as well as Swedish men and Slovenian women. For Belgium, this is likely 
the consequence of the very extensive early retirement facilities (The Social Protection Committee, 
2007; 2008); and in Greece the fact that one can attain a full pension after 37 career years may play 
a role (The Social Protection Committee, 2007). Based on the information collected, it is diffi  cult to 
fi nd a reason for Slovenia’s position. However, the fact that Swedish men have a preference for earlier 
retirement than what could be expected based on the independent variables may be related to the 
rise in the Swedish legal retirement age from 65 to 67 between 2004 and 2010. Even though we could 
not confi rm Hypothesis 2b, as too few countries changed their retirement age over this period for 
meaningful analysis, this result does indicate that it remains an open question for future research.
Conclusion
Many Eastern European countries still carry an inheritance of the Soviet Union in their pension 
system in the form of low and gendered retirement ages. Due to increasing life expectancies and 
the European Union’s employment targets, many of these countries are in the process of raising the 
offi  cial retirement age or will have to do so in the future. Therefore, this study aims to investigate 
when individuals want to retire, and which individual, societal and institutional factors infl uence 
this preferred retirement age. We specifi cally try to explain for the gap in preferred retirement age 
between Eastern and Western European countries. Using European Social Survey data from 2010, which 
includes the information of some 4,500 employees aged 50 to 69 in 24 European countries, we fi nd 
that two main elements explain this East-West division in preferred retirement age: job characteristics 
and retirement policies.
Applying Karasek’s job demand/control model, our study shows that job characteristics are 
essential in shaping individuals’ retirement preferences. While Karasek points out that workload and 
being able to make decisions regarding the organisation of your own work are key to mental and 
physical well-being and hence to being able to work longer, we show that they also play an important 
role in making people want to work longer. Having decisional discretion has a particularly signifi cant 
eff ect on preferred retirement age, and even though job control does infl uence mental and physical 
2 With four country-level variables in a model with only 22 countries, Model 4 is already overloaded. Therefore, 
we do not include the female retirement age in 2004.
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well-being, the eff ect on retirement preferences goes well beyond. However, post-socialist countries 
diff er from the rest of Europe in two ways in this regard. First, individuals in the East have worse 
working conditions, in particular low job control. Especially infl uential is the fact that they have 
fewer opportunities to organise their daily work themselves and to infl uence policy decisions at work. 
Second, while the Karasek model seems to fi t Western European countries well in terms of explaining 
when people want to retire, the eff ects are rather diff erent in the East of Europe. There the positive 
eff ect of job control on the preferred retirement age is only half the size it is in the West, and when 
the negative impact of job demand on well-being is controlled for, job demand has a similar eff ect 
on the dependent variable as job control. It is diffi  cult to determine what could cause this diff erence 
between the East and West, though it might be related to diff erences in how people perceive their jobs 
in both parts of Europe. Fargher et al. (2008) fi nd that job satisfaction in Eastern European countries is 
mainly related to wage and how important one considers working in general, while in the West, job 
satisfaction is determined by a much wider set of social and cultural variables. The authors suggest 
that this might be the consequence of work ethics promoted by the Soviet Union. Our fi nding that 
people who are feeling happy and satisfi ed with life want to retire later in Western countries and 
earlier in Eastern countries might indeed refl ect this diff erent relation between work and the rest 
of life. It should be noted, however, that also in Western Europe the intermediary variables related 
to mental and physical well-being only partly account for the eff ects of job demand and job control. 
This may be the consequence of job demand and control being related to much more than mere well-
being. Possibly, they are also related to identifying with one’s work or seeing work as self-realisation, 
which in turn may stimulate individuals to work longer.
Individuals’ retirement preferences are also determined by legal retirement age. The lower legal 
retirement ages and gender discrimination in retirement policies in many Eastern European countries 
explain a large part of the diff erence in preferred retirement age between Eastern and Western Europe. 
When asked when they want to retire, individuals probably use the legal retirement age as a ‘reference 
standard’ and weigh their personal situation off  against it. This may work in a process similar to what 
Archer described as ‘internal conversation’, where they decide that, based on how hard the work is 
they do, how long they have worked etc., they would like to work a few years less than the offi  cial 
retirement age. However, the discrepancy between the legal and preferred retirement ages is larger in 
countries with a higher legal retirement age. Lacking a suffi  cient amount of countries that changed 
the legal retirement age between 2004 and 2010, we could not confi rm whether a preference, in this 
case the preference to retire early, develops into a ‘habit’. It is up to future research to determine 
to what extent a change in legal retirement age aff ects diff erent age groups in terms of retirement 
preferences.
While Esser (2005b) does not see the need to raise the legal retirement age — one can change 
individuals’ retirement preference by adapting the welfare and production regimes —, our results 
suggest that changing these preferences can also be done by changing the legal retirement age. As 
such, this article is good news for politicians seeking to heighten the legal retirement age in an 
attempt to make people work longer. However, it also points at the need for accompanying measures 
improving working conditions in general and employee job control in particular, which might in the 
end be a more eff ective way to motivate people to work longer. Even though we discuss the eff ects of 
job characteristics only at the individual level in this paper, it is clear that they are strongly connected 
to macro-level policies. The eff ects can, for instance, be linked to Esser’s (2005b) fi nding that there is 
a stronger preference for later retirement in more regulated labour markets and in countries where 
more eff ort is geared towards training older individuals.
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